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Roughly speaking, there are two schools of thought concerning Socrates'^
defense of justice in the Republic: those who acknowledge, following David
Sachs' influential discussion of the question,^ that Socrates' arguments fail
successfully to defend the form of justice which he was asked to defend,
and those who claim that in some way they do defend it successfully. These
two groups share the conviction that Socrates intends to defend this
"vulgar" conception of justice, and that if he fails to do so successfully then
he has not done a good job.
In fact, as I will argue, Socrates constructs an argument which, despite
his occasional protests to the contrary, does not seriously aim to defend
"vulgar" justice, and he does so deliberately, out of conviction. Socrates'
own concept of justice emphasizes the overriding principle of improving the
soul, and does not demand obeying the social rules which underlie vulgar
justice. But this does not represent a "failure" on Socrates' part, for his goal
is not "to do a good job" in defending any notion at all—he was not a
Sophist—but rather to illuminate the truth as he saw it.
This study thus aims to suggest a new paradigm for understanding
Socratic arguments. The defense of justice is only one case in which
Socrates' apparent conclusions do not follow from his arguments. While it
is surely not reasonable to expect anyone, even a philosopher, to
consistently construct perfect arguments, Plato's arguments are frequently
so unconvincing that it is difficult to see how anyone who could set forth the
problems as clearly as he does could be satisfied with the solutions he
offers. But if Plato's arguments do not prove what they claim to prove,
' This research was supported by THE ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION founded by the
Israel Academy of Science and Humanities. Earlier versions of this paper were read at
Seminars of the Classics and Philosophy departments at Bar Ilan University. I wish to thank
John Glucker, Ranon Kalzoff, David Schaps and Ephraim Meir for their useful comments on
these occasions.
"
I have tried to be consistent in using the term "Socrates" to refer to the character in the
dialogue, and "Plato" to refer to the author. When I wish to refer to the historical Socrates I
make this explicit.
' D. Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic" The Philosophical Review 72 (1963) 141-58,
reprinted in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays II (Garden City, NY 1971)
35-51.
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there might be some value in clarifying what, if anything, they do prove.
Such an investigation would provide a better guide to the thoughts of the
author than any attempts to correct, revise or improve upon his arguments
so that they fit better to their presumed object. My suspicion is that the
apparent defense of a thesis often serves in Plato's hands as a convenient
method of revising or clarifying the meaning of that thesis, and hence that
one cannot understand properly what Plato is claiming unless one follows
the arguments in detail.
This paper aims to contribute in another way as well. The field of
Platonic scholarship remains divided between those who, however
appreciative of Plato's artistry, view the dialogues as philosophic discourses
with artistic trappings, and those who view the dialogues as essentially
artistic, with the philosophic content taking a secondary role. Attempts to
see how literary analysis can help solve the philosophic problems are still
rare."* This paper attempts to show how attention to literary features can
help place the philosophic problems in a context in which they are no longer
so troublesome.
Finally, the paper aims to shed some light on the teachings of the
historical Socrates, with respect to justice. Despite the apologetic purposes
of both Plato and Xenophon, neither of them is so bold as to completely
whitewash Socrates' ambiguous attitude towards justice, and towards the
property rights of others in particular. It seems to me that their revealing
admissions about Socrates' attitude on these points would be
incomprehensible if they did not reflect the attitudes of the historical
Socrates.
I
A major crux in the argument of Plato's Republic occurs when, after having
described his "city in speech," Socrates returns to the original question or
challenge which had been posed and offers an answer. Socrates had been
asked to prove, against Thrasymachus, that "justice pays," that the just man
who suffers materially is nevertheless happier than the wicked man who
prospers materially. It has long been recognized that, in his answer,
Socrates relies on a different understanding of justice than that implied in
the question, and as a result, it has been claimed, he fails to answer the
question he was asked.
The original question concerned a popular notion of justice which is not
easily defined, and may be finally incoherent. The "Cephalean" formulation
was perhaps the most straightforward: Justice means not lying or stealing
"• Charles Kahn is a notable exception. See in particular his "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's
Gorgias," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983) 75-121.
Gabriel Danzig 87
(331c). ^ Longer lists of prohibited misdeeds are offered later (344b-c;
348d; 360a-c; 442e-43a). This concept of justice is more than merely
observing the law but it is tied up essentially with the observance of some
general rules of behavior, which Socrates describes later as the observance
of vulgar standards of justice {ta phortika 442el).* Still, the subject is
dikaiosune, and this means, as has been noticed, that we are concerned with
the character trait which leads to this observance.''
It is often said that this vulgar dikaiosune is "other-regarding," but there
is no indication of such concern in the discussions with Cephalus or his son
Polemarchus. The motives for observing vulgar justice are left vague, and
Adeimantus later argues that they may be purely selfish (362d ff.).
Although difficult to define, this form of justice is characterized by the
observance of general rules of behavior with respect to the outside world.
^
Socrates attacks this concept in the first book on the grounds that very
important goals, such as the preservation of life, surely take precedence over
the strict observance of rules (331c).^ His own concept of justice will
correct this weakness through emphasizing the goals of just action. To this
degree his conception of justice has close affinities with utilitarianism, with
all its problems.'"
'
I refer to this as the Cephalean formulation only for the sake of convenience. In fact,
Socrates extracts this formulation from Cephalus' speech while Cephalus himself makes no
attempt to say what justice is.
^ The translation "common standards" does not reflect the pejorative sense of la phortika,
and has contributed to the mistaken belief that Socrates seriously defends the observance of
these standards.
' R. H. Weingartner, "Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice," Philosophical and
Phenomenological Research 25 (1964) 248-62, at p. 251. This is emphasized also in Book 2
when Adeimantus asks to see what justice does in the soul (366e).
* This is the Platonic distinction, as appears in his description of "true" justice: "not with
respect to the external minding of one's business, but with respect to the internal, since it truly
concerns him and his own" (443c). This and all other translations cited here are my own.
' Joseph has argued that one of the main purposes of the discussion in Book 1 is to show that
justice is not conforming to rules of behavior. See H. W. B. Joseph, Essays in Ancient and
Modern Philosophy (Oxford 1935) p. 2 and Chapter 2, cited by J. Schiller, "Just Men and Just
Acts in the Republic." Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968) 1-14.
'"There has been in this century a persistent minority voice attributing some form of
utilitarianism to Plato. See H. Prichard's inaugural lecture of 1928, "Duty and Interest,"
reprinted in Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest: Lectures by H. A. Prichard (Oxford
1968) 203 ff.; J. D. Mabbott, "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?" MiVirf 46 (1937) 386-93, revised
and reprinted in Vlaslos (above, note 3) 57-65; R. Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education
(London 1975); and J. L. Creed, "Is It Wrong to Call Plato a Utilitarian?" CQ 28 (1978) 349-
65. J. H. Muirhead, Rule and End in Morals (London 1932; repr. Freeport, NY 1969) 3,
classified Plato's as a teleological theory of obligation. J. Annas also notes the similarity; see
"Plato and Common Morality," CQ 27 (1978) 437-51. at p. 448.
Plato is obviously not a modern utilitarian, of either a Benthamite or a Millian persuasion,
but the term "utilitarian" is appropriate both as a reflection of Plato's own terms (ophelimon,
lusiteloun, kerdaleon, sumpheron, 336d; see also Cratylus 416e-I7a and Hippias Major 295b-
96e) and because it helps make the point that Plato is not concerned with universal rules of
behavior, but with actions that lead to good results. By using the term "utilitarian," I do not
mean to suggest that he held a worked-out theory of utilitarian ethics; nor is it my intention to
provide one for him. I merely mean that for Plato the justification of any action is its
contribution to spiritual health (and hence to happiness).
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Socrates defends justice on the grounds of self-interest. In Book 2 he is
asked to explain why it is against my interest to act unjustly, even supposing
that I should not get caught, and that through my success I gain many good
things, such as wealth, honors and even a reputation as a generous and just
man. Socrates must show that justice is beneficial in itself, even without the
success, good reputation and other "non-natural" effects it might produce,
but he is not committed to showing that it is worth while to be just and
miserable." He will not attempt to show that justice is better than
happiness, but that it produces more happiness despite material misfortune
than material fortune would produce in the absence of justice. '^ He will
argue that justice is more choiceworthy than anything one could acquire
through injustice precisely because it contributes more to happiness than
anything else possibly could, whereas injustice destroys all possibility of
happiness.'^
The terms of this defense already tell us something about Socrates'
conception of justice: He will defend it as something beneficial. Only if
Socrates can define benefit in such a way that it will never be dependent on
anything obtainable through vulgar injustice will he be able to offer a good
defense of vulgar justice. In fact, in the later part of the Republic Socrates
spends a good deal of effort in revising ordinary conceptions of benefit, and
he thereby reduces the possibility of conflict between vulgar justice and
benefit. But he does not eliminate it.
Moreover, Socrates spends at least as much effort revising ordinary
conceptions of justice. The fact that he begins his defense with a lengthy
investigation of the true nature of justice shows this clearly enough. After
constructing a "city in speech" in which justice can be seen more clearly
than in an individual, Socrates comes to a clear formulation of his new
conception of justice. According to Socrates, "true justice"'"* (443c) is a
kind of psychic harmony, in which the mind rules the thiimos or spirit,
which in turn aids it in ruling the passions. Once the question is framed in
this way, Glaucon readily agrees that the just man, the psychically healthy
man, is happier than the unjust or sick man, and that no amount of material
prosperity could compensate for a lack of psychic health. '^ Socrates has not
significantly revised ordinary conceptions of benefit at this point, as
Glaucon' s emphatic response clearly shows, but he has revised ordinary
" C. Kirwan, "Glaucon's Challenge," Phronesis 10 (1965) 162-73. See also Schiller
(above, note 9) 5.
'^The emphasis on a quantitative comparison is reflected later in the attempt to calculate
arithmetically the superiority of the philosopher over the tyrant in Book 9 (586b-88a).
" At AllA, Socrates restates the challenge in a simple form. They are seeking justice, which
he refers to as "what the man who's going to be happy must possess, whether it escapes the
notice of all gods and humans or not."
''' Or: "justice as it is in truth."
'5Book4, 445a-b.
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conceptions of justice.'* The justice which is beneficial is not ordinary
justice at all. How are we to judge this?'''
II
There have been a variety of responses. David Sachs argued that we have a
fallacy in Plato's argument:'^ "Attempts to show that Platonic justice (-
true justice) entails ordinary morality are strikingly absent from the
Republic. Plato merely assumes that having the one involves having the
other."" Although Socrates never argues that possessing vulgar justice is
better than not possessing it, Sachs, being charitable, considers the
possibility that the defense of Platonic justice is intended as a covert defense
of vulgar justice. In order for this to work, Socrates would have to show
mutual entailment: both (1) that those who possess Platonic justice
necessarily obey the rules of ordinary justice, and (2) that those who obey
those rules necessarily possess Platonic justice. Once we assume, with
Sachs, that Socrates' argument is designed to prove these implausible
theses, it will not be difficult to accept Sachs' conclusion that the argument
is fallacious or nonexistent.
Terence Irwin comes to similar conclusions. 2° In his view, Socrates
"wants to show that p-justice [psychic justice = Platonic justice] is justice,
that it is the virtue we normally refer to; that is why his argument is meant
to answer Thrasymachus."^' Yet he also argues that "Plato's argument for
the definition of p-justice does not try to show that p-justice is justice; he
'* See Vlastos' comment that the Socratic definition has "no discernible link with ordinary
usage"; "Justice and Happiness in Plato's Republic," in Vlastos (above, note 3) 66-95, at p. 70.
One may argue that in Plato's mind the original questions were poorly formulated, and as
a result cannot be properly answered. Plato's strategy, then, is to show the incoherence of
popular conceptions of justice, and then to move on to a more coherent conception in which the
question can be reformulated and answered. On this reading, there would be no point in any
attempt to extract from Plato an answer to the original question. (I am grateful to John Rist for
suggesting this line of interpretation.)
To this argument I would reply that it is Plato who formulated the original question, and that
he did not formulate it merely in order to demonstrate its incoherence. For after arguably doing
so in the first book, he reinstates the original question in Book 2 without making any essential
reformulation of the underlying conception of justice, and he refers back to the original vulgar
standards when, in Book 4, he gets around to answering the question. Plato thinks the original
question is important, and he is right to think so: The original question remains important for
all people who are incapable of becoming truly just, and even for those who are, as we shall see
below.
'*'The point was noticed earlier by G. Grote, Plalo and other Companions of Sokrates
(London 1888) 99-110 and A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek
Values (Oxford 1960) 289. See also N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis
1979), who points out (131) that if Plato equivocates then he cannot be properly said to have
actually denied what Thrasymachus was asserting.
" Sachs in Vlastos (above, note 3) 47.
-°
I make use here of his earlier treatment of the problem in Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford
1977). His later treatment in Plato's Ethics (Oxford 1995) is also valuable for the i
analysis and solutions it proposes.
-' Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory {previous note) 205, italics added.
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assumes over-confidently that 'justice' must refer to exactly the same
condition of state and soul."-^ This last is an overstatement, but not a
serious one. Socrates does elicit from Glaucon the agreement that the man
of p-justice is least likely to perform the sort of action ordinarily called
unjust (442e^3a). But Irwin's conclusion still stands:
[H]e has not shown why a p-just man's rational plan of life would not
include some c-unjust actions needed to fulfil it. And if the p-Just man
avoids c-unjust actions only for his soul's good, his desire for moral
exercise will not obviously prescribe regular c-justice [common justice =
vulgar justice] in other people's interests. If Plato cannot defend a virtue
which benefits other people, he has not defended the virtue of justice
challenged by Thrasymachus and Glaucon. But so far he has offered no
good reason to a p-just man to benefit others; either we must agree that no
sound moral theory can offer a better reason, or we must find Plato's
theory altogether inadequate to explain a primary aspect of virtue.--'
Some have attempted to defend Socrates by arguing that there is no
fallacy but merely a lacuna. For Raphael Demos, the missing step is not too
far-fetched: He points out that being truly just means being ruled by reason,
and that reason aims at grasping and instantiating the forms of the good and
the just.-"* But the lacuna is still there, for Demos acknowledges that he has
not shown that the form of the just is instantiated by the observance of
vulgar standards of justice. This problem haunts most of the attempts to
"defend" Socrates.
Richard Kraut's attempts to fill in the missing link are illuminating but
no more successful. ^^ He argues that the harmonized individual, or
philosopher, will be just because he has no desire to be unjust. For the
philosopher, the desires of reason are far stronger than the desires of thumos
and appetite, and his life of reason cannot be improved by anything which
injustice can provide. This is certainly one of the main thrusts of Socrates'
argument: Socrates' just man will have very little interest in material
possessions. But will he have no material needs at all? And if he does have
some, how should he satisfy them?
Socrates has not really said anything against ordinary injustice, theft
and the like, and the arguments Kraut uses to shore up Socrates' failure to
do so are surely, as Julia Annas has pointed out,^* overly optimistic. They
rest explicitly on the improbable assumption that the philosopher will
^^ Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (above, note 20) 205-06, italics added.
^^ Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (above, note 20) 211-12.
^'' R. Demos, "A Fallacy in Plato's RepublicT The Philosophical Review 73 (1964) 395-98,
reprinted in Vlastos (above, note 3) 52-56.
^' R. Kraut, "Reason and Justice in Plato's Republic," in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos and
R. M. Rorty (eds.). Exegesis and Argument. Phronesis Suppl. 1 (Assen 1973) 207-24.
-^ As she points out, such a reading makes Socrates' arguments irrelevant: "By the time we
have stipulated that conditions are such that there is no competition in the way people obtain
their differing goals, we have got rid of what was worrying Thrasymachus even without any
doctrine of Platonic justice" (Annas [above, note 10] 441).
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already possess or have access to everything he needs for his life of
leisure:^'' And yet Socrates himself felt the need to ask for guaranteed
meals at the public expense. It is hard to resist pointing out that Kraut's
argument implies that if the philosopher did lack some of these things, he
would have no reason not to obtain them through acts of vulgar injustice.-^
All of these problems are the result of the misguided attempt to make
Socrates prove things he was never trying to prove. As both Vlastos and
Annas seem to recognize, Plato is concerned with developing his own rival
concept of justice, and has no real interest in defending the behavior of
ordinary "just" citizens.-' His referring to this form of justice as "vulgar" is
one hint that it is just not his main concern.
In Annas' reading, the Republic makes an attempt "to shift the centre of
gravity of Greek ethics from an act-centered to an agent-centered type of
theory. "''' But this can be understood in two ways. Annas appears to mean
that Plato is concerned with defending a character trait which directly
encourages the observance of vulgar standards of justice, something like the
dikaiosune which is discussed in Book 1. On this reading, while the
concern is with character, the character-trait in question is one recognizably
associated with the observance of vulgar justice. In fact, however, Socrates
is concerned with a different character-trait and a different conception of
justice. The shift which Plato envisions is more than a shift between an act-
centered and an agent-centered theory of ordinary or vulgar justice. It is a
shift from the observance of the proper rules of behavior to an imperative to
achieve personal psychic harmony, a shift from a "rules-centered" to a
(spiritual) "goals-oriented" conception of justice. But in any society where
ordinary rules of justice hold sway, a "goals-oriented" approach will
generate conflicts with the ordinary rules of behavior. Any new morality
which differs practically from the old morality will inevitably include some
elements of the old //^morality, and all the more so when the new morality
is not based on rules.-"
^' See also the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias, where this problem is raised explicitly (394a5-b5).
-* There have been other attempts as well. Schiller (above, note 9) 6 argues that "the value
of just action is that it alone can . . . guarantee the continuance of [a person's] balanced soul."
But for this argument to work. Plato would have to be thinking of vulgarly just action. On
Vlastos, see the extensive and perceptive critique by R. Sartorius, "Fallacy and Political
Radicalism in Plato's Republic" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1974) 349-63.
-' Vlastos (above, note 16) 95 comments that Plato "thinks the masses, if they lack the
requisite paideia, capable of nothing better than a degenerate morality . . ." Schiller (above,
note 9) raises the possibility that Plato does not intend to defend common morality (3) but later
dismisses it (4-5).
'" Annas (above, note 10) 444.
'' Vlastos (above, note 16) 78 argues that the new morality is more onerous, but
acknowledges that it is "more flexible in form."
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III
Socrates tries to minimize the conflict between the vulgar and Platonic
forms of justice, but he never argues or claims that the two are simply
compatible. When he compares true justice with the vulgar standards his
interlocutors have in mind (442d7^3b6), he only claims, at most, that a
truly just man will tend to conform to vulgar standards. But it is difficult to
extract his own, or Plato's, opinion with any certainty from the exchange
between Socrates and Glaucon.
After concluding his account of the truly just man, Socrates returns to
the question of vulgar standards of justice, and convinces Glaucon that a
truly just man would not violate such standards (442e^3a):
If it should be necessary for us to agree about that city, and about a
man bom and raised like it, whether it seems that such a one would steal a
deposit of gold or silver which he had accepted, do you think that anyone
would think he would do this rather than those who are not such?
No one, he replied.
Glaucon's admission here may well be a reflection of his own imperfect,
thumotic character. Glaucon protested earlier that Socrates' ideal city did
not contain enough relishes, and was willing to go to war for the sake of
superfluous material goods (372c). Theft for him is motivated solely by the
desire for excess wealth, and he cannot imagine why the truly just and
moderate man would have a motive to violate vulgar standards of justice.
Glaucon's admission here is as much a commentary on his own character as
a reflection of Socrates' or Plato's opinion.
But even if we take Glaucon's assent as a genuine expression of Plato's
opinion, it does not amount to a principled rejection of ordinary injustice.
Glaucon does not imagine that the character-trait of justice would eliminate
theft altogether: It would only make the just man less likely than anyone
else to steal, for it would drastically reduce the motive of theft. Here
Socrates draws a link between psychic and vulgar justice, but he does it in a
manner which is designed to show the link precisely as it is: The truly just
man tends, but only tends, to observe the laws of vulgar justice.
But there is a further difficulty with the argument. Although Glaucon
agrees that a Platonically just man, like a just city, would be unlikely to
commit acts of vulgar injustice, this does not amount to the claim that the
observance of Platonic justice entails the observance of vulgar justice as
well. Such a conclusion would be warranted only if we could assume that
the Platonically just man, who tends to observe vulgar justice, also observes
Platonic justice as well. In that case, his observance of both standards
would imply the compatibility of the two standards. But unlike Aristotle,
who defines just acts as the acts of a just man,^- Socrates does not argue that
" NE5.\.i,\ 129a6 ff. See also White (above, note 18) 135 note f.
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the acts of the Platonically just man are Platonically just acts, and the
Aristotelian model may have misled some commentators.-^-^
Socrates clearly distinguishes between justice, the harmony of the soul,
and just action. Just action is defined not as that which flows from a just
disposition, but as that which leads to or preierve^ justice in the soul (443e-
44a): 34
In all these actions he judges and names a just and fine action one that
preserves and helps to produce this condition, and wisdom the knowledge
that supervises this action, and injustice an action which would undo this
condition, and ignorance the opinion which supervises this action.
According to this definition, all acts which produce and preserve the
harmony of the soul are just.-^' It is a "utilitarian"^^ conception of justice,
defining justice by its consequences. Anyone can perform such acts,
whether already just (harmonized) or not.
It is easy to understand why it would be worth while to be just and to
act justly on Socrates' definition. But there is nothing in this definition
which implies either that the observance of Platonic justice would entail the
observance of vulgar justice as well, or that the Platonically just or
harmonized individual would necessarily observe Platonic justice. Being
already spiritually harmonized, the Platonically just man has no need to act
to instill a harmonized soul, but only to preserve it. Because he is not
pursuing Platonic justice, it may be easier for him to observe vulgar justice
than it would be for someone still on the upward path. Although Socrates
argues that the Platonically just man would tend to act in accordance with
I'M/gar justice, since he does not argue that he would act in accordance with
Platonic justice, he is not offering any argument for the compatibility of the
two standards of action.
It is notorious that Socrates never shows that Platonically unjust people,
those who still lack a harmonized soul, should conform to vulgar standards
of justice. But we may add that he does not even show that those among
them who pursue Platonic justice would conform to vulgar standards. As
" Annas (above, note 10) 447 assumes that for Plato as for Aristotle, "virtuous acts are
those that the good man would do in such circumstances."
^'* See also 444c-<l. Teaching is for Socrates the prime example of doing justice: Socrates
agrees to Glaucon's request to describe moderation "so as not to do an injustice" (430e; see
also 337d).
-" In Book 9, Socrates explains that the intelligent man will subordinate all of his activities
to the goal of acquiring and maintaining a healthy soul (591c-92a). See White (above, note
18) 135 note d. For Maimonides, this principle is so important that it justifies a transgression
of the Law. See Maimonides" Eight Chapters. Chapter 5 in R. L. Weiss and C. E. Butlerworlh
(eds.). Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York 1975).
-'* See above, note 10. The "utilitarian" character of Socratic justice is indicated clearly in
the present context: Acts of justice are "supervised" by wisdom, and as we have learned only a
few lines earlier, wisdom in the city "possesses within it the knowledge of that which is
beneficial (sumpheron) for each part and for the whole composed of the community of these
three parts" (442c). By connecting justice with wisdom, Socrates is also connecting it with
utility.
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we have seen, Platonic justice permits, even obligates, all acts which lead to
the harmony of the soul, but Socrates does not even attempt to show that
such acts of Platonic justice would always conform with vulgar standards.
Socrates argues only that the Platonically just man tends to conform to
vulgar standards of justice, nothing more.^''
In another passage which might seem relevant, Socrates argues that the
performance of just acts engenders Platonic justice, while the performance
of unjust acts engenders injustice (444c-d). This passage could appear to
imply that the observance of vulgar justice leads to the harmonization of the
soul, and this in turn would imply that it is justified on Platonic grounds.
On such an interpretation, the argument would be highly implausible:
Socrates presents no argument to show that such observance is always the
best way to reach the desired results, and it is hard to imagine that either he
or anyone else could do so. In fact, he does not speak of vulgar justice at all
in the passage, and is presumably thinking of acts of Platonic justice which,
as he has said, are precisely those which lead to the harmonization of
the soul.
In a later passage (589d-90a), Socrates seems to say that acts of vulgar
justice lead to justice in the soul. But here the claim is hypothetical: It
would be worth abstaining from theft, Socrates argues, if such theft causes
harm to the soul. He does not present any argument that it does, far less that
it always does. There are, then, no arguments which make the implausible
assertion that vulgar justice and Platonic justice are mutually entailing or
even consistently compatible.
IV
The important point, however, is not simply that Socrates never successfully
defends vulgar justice, but rather that Plato himself is clearly aware of this
failure, and even presents Socrates as being aware of it. For this reason we
can draw the conclusion that the arguments in the Republic do not represent
a serious attempt to defend vulgar justice.
To my mind, it is inconceivable that Plato should not be aware of the
divergence between the vulgar and the "true" concept of justice: He after
all is the one who discusses them in detail and offers the terms by which we
distinguish them. As Rolf Sartorius has pointed out,^^ Plato's Callicles in
the Gorgias accuses Socrates of equivocating between natural and
conventional notions of justice (482e-83a), and it is hard to imagine that
" An individual performing only Platonically just acts would violate any ideal code of
behavior, unless one could be devised which systematically allows for every possible act which
aims at the harmony of the soul. This helps explain why Plato regards the rule of wisdom as in
principle superior to the rule of the law. See White (above, note 18) 132 and J. Macy, "The
Rule of Law and the Rule of Wisdom in Plato, al-Farabi, and Maimonides," in W. M. Brinner
and S. D. Ricks (eds.). Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions (Atlanta 1986) 205-32.
^* Sartorius (above, note 28) 351-52.
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Plato would unknowingly commit a mistake which he himself has pointed
out in a previous dialogue. In fact equivocation in the use of the term
"justice" is still very much on his mind in the Republic. At the end of the
discussion in Book 1, Socrates comments that he regrets not having defined
the term before they considered whether or not it is a vice, and whether or
not it is profitable (354b-c).
There are many indications that Plato is aware of the distinction, and
that he intends Socrates to defend only Platonic justice.^^ When
Adeimantus suggests that he will add something to Glaucon's speech
against vulgar justice, Socrates responds (362d), "So you too, if he leaves
out anything, come to his defense. And yet, what he said was already
enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out [vulgar]
justice." After hearing Adeimantus' speech he returns to the problem
(368b):
I'm at a loss what to do. On the one hand, I can't help out. For in my
opinion I'm not capable of it; my proof is that when I thought I showed in
what I said to Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice, you didn't
accept it from me. On the other hand, I can't not help out. For I'm afraid
it might be impious to be here when justice is being spoken badly of and
give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to make a
sound."*"
Socrates agrees to defend (vulgar) justice out of a sense of responsibility
rather than philosophic conviction. He does not state why he is unable to
persuade his friends of the value of justice
—
perhaps it is a result of his
personal state of ignorance, as Thrasymachus has previously charged
(337a-38b), and as he has himself acknowledged. But he is surely able to
mount an impressive defense of the Platonic conception of justice.
Socrates' hesitation is more likely attributable to his inability to defend the
vulgar conception of justice he was asked to defend, but which he never
does defend.'" It is not a coincidence, then, that a weak or nonexistent
defense follows this announcement; on the contrary the announcement
serves as a warning to look for problems in the argument. Not only is the
argument "weak" but Plato wishes us to notice its weakness. Only then will
we see the troublesome implications of the doctrine of Platonic justice.
As Socrates develops his argument he makes the contrast between the
two conceptions of justice perfectly clear. He has chosen to illuminate
'' Contrast Annas (above, note 10) 438, Sachs in Vlastos (above, note 3) 47.
'"' This is not the only passage in the Republic where Socrates indicates his inability or
unwillingness to refute Thrasymachus' argument. See also 357b2, 427c-d. In other places he
says that he does not know what justice is (337e-38b): Does he not mean vulgar justice?
"" We note that Socrates speaks here of offering a defense of justice, motivated by piety, and
not an impartial investigation. He uses military language (repeated use of boethein), and places
more emphasis on the use of his voice than his reason in making this defense. The later image
of the cave, and especially the inability of the philosopher to understand the dark images on the
wall of the cave, is surely intended in part to explain Socrates' inability to offer explanations
for common conceptions such as that underlying vulgar justice.
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justice by creating a city in speech in which justice will be more visible.
The just city as a whole is treated as parallel to the just individual. The
behavior of the just city should therefore tell us something about the
behavior of the just individual Socrates has in mind. Justice in the city
consists in everyone "doing his own business" {to heaulou prattein) and, in
particular, in each class sticking to its own task (433a ff.). This definition
parallels justice in the soul of the individual, which is said to be the
harmony of the three parts of the soul, resulting from each part of the soul
doing its own business. But the harmony between the parts of the soul does
not imply that the whole person would "do his own business," and nothing
implies that doing one's own business means observing vulgar standards of
justice.
The internal harmony of the city does not prevent it from making war
on other cities, and war is not a marginal activity in the ideal city. The
education of the guardian class, from whose ranks will come the
philosopher-kings, and which occupies no small part of the Republic, is in
the first place a training for war. War in this city is not merely defensive
war, but is rather offensive, aimed at enlarging the city's territory (373d-e).
War is motivated by the need for territory and not by justice: It is clear that
the city's internal justice does not conflict with its aggressive international
relations. If we take this analogy seriously, we will conclude that just as the
harmonious city is capable of making war against other cities, so too the
harmonious individual is capable of making "war" against other individuals.
Such war would be motivated by something analogous to the need to
increase territory. ''^
In accordance with this, Socrates offers an indication of the aggressive
nature of the just man after concluding the definition of justice and
examining the other virtues in the soul. Although the just man's reason
rules his thumos, it does not tell the thumos to avoid aggressive behavior.
On the contrary (442b),
these two do the finest job of guarding against enemies from without on
behalf of all of the soul and the body, the one deliberating, the other
making war, following the ruler, and with its courage fulfilling what has
been decided.
' One may object that it is improper to view the "inflamed" city as a model of health of the
soul. However:
1. Socrates never returns to the model of the so-called healthy city, but rather purges
the inflamed city without eliminating the need for war motivated by the need for land.
2. The relishes Glaucon desires, which lead to the construction of the "inflamed" city,
are later said to be among the necessary desires (559a-b).
3. Socrates does not indicate in any way that the inflamed city is an inappropriate
analogy to the just man; on the contrary, he finds justice in it and explicitly draws a
parallel to the just individual.
Gosling's suggestion that there is no room for justice in the first city, and that Socrates
deliberately provoked Glaucon into replacing it with the "inflamed" city, is also worth noting.
See J. C. B. Gosling, Plalo (London 1973) 18-19.
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Further, although the subject is a complex one, it is clear that Socrates
is willing to use lies for good purposes within the just city.''-'' This sort of
behavior is not justified only in an ideal city: Socrates himself is frequently
depicted telling helpful lies in the dialogues of Plato.'''' Since the avoidance
of lying and stealing were the two components of the Cephalean concept of
justice, it appears that Plato wishes to indicate to the reader that Socrates
condones precisely this vulgar injustice in at least some circumstances.
As Kraut and others have made clear, the Platonically just man is not
committed to justice, but merely uninterested in the goods which injustice
can obtain, and it is for this reason alone that he tends to abstain from
injustice. The author of the Republic is fully aware of this fact, and
indicates it by the curious literary relationship he establishes between
Platonic justice and moderation. After finishing his discussion of wisdom
and courage, Socrates suggests skipping moderation and going straight for
justice (430d). When Glaucon objects to this, Socrates describes
moderation as a kind of "harmonia" of the desires, in which the higher
elements of the soul dominate the lower (430e-31b; 43 le). After describing
moderation in this way, Socrates has difficulty finding anything left to call
justice (432b-e). Clearly he had intended to describe justice in the terms he
uses for moderation, and in the end he does call justice a kind of harmonia
(443d-e). In the meantime, he defines justice by a formula which was often
applied to moderation: "doing one's own business" (433b; compare
Charmides 161b). The interchangeability of justice and moderation is
particularly striking in a passage in which Socrates has chosen to bring
justice to light by a process of elimination (427e-28a)! This odd
argumentation draws our attention to the fact that Socrates is able to defend
justice only by reducing it to moderation. But, precisely for this reason, the
justice he is defending is not the justice he was asked to defend.
When Socrates finally comes to define justice for the individual, he
remembers the parallel to justice in the city quite clearly (443c-e):
And in truth justice was, it seems, something like this—but not with
respect to the external minding of one's business, but with respect to the
internal, since it truly concerns him and his own. He doesn't let each part
in him do foreign business or the three classes in the soul meddle in the
affairs of each other, but truly sets his own things in good order and he
himself rules over himself. He organizes himself, becomes a friend to
himself, and harmonizes the three parts, exactly like three notes in a
harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle. And if there are some other
parts in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one from
many, moderate and harmonized.
'-' Book 3, 389b-d; 414b-e. Allhough the guardians are also said to be truthful (485c-d)
Plato clearly means that they love to know the truth, which is quite different from speaking it.
See also Book 5, 459c-d; Laws 2, 663d ff.
^ An unambiguous example of helpful Socratic lying may be found al Charmides 155b.
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As justice in the city is an internal quality, not directly concerned with
international relations, so too justice in the human being is an internal
quality, not directly concerned with "external" affairs. Far from describing
an "other-directed" quality, Plato is at pains to point out that justice is
concerned only with the inner life of the individual. This is a natural result
of the way Plato has shaped the entire argument, defending justice by
showing how it contributes to one's own happiness.
Socrates does not claim that the just man leads a passive life. On the
contrary he is able to act, "either concerning the acquisition of money, or
the care of the body, or something political, or concerning private contracts"
(443e). His well-balanced soul may make him better equipped to act, all
other things being equal, than is the unjust man. This was Socrates' point in
Book 1, where he argued that justice makes a city or individual better able
to wage war (351a ff.). But there is nothing about his justice which induces
him to act for the sake of others, to restrain his actions out of consideration
for their good, or even to observe the ordinary conventions of justice.
There is no good reason to believe that acting purely for the sake of a
healthy soul would necessarily entail observing vulgar standards of justice.
Clearly there are cases where the two standards would conflict:
1. Taking money from—or not returning money to—a rich man whose
money leads him to ignore the development of his character and intellect, or
those of others, could be a just act by Socrates' definition, as it could lead
the rich man to re-evaluate his life, and it would, at least, prevent him from
harming himself and others by misusing his money. This is Socrates' point
in his discussion with Cephalus and Polemarchus in Book 1. Note how he
replaces the "weapon" which should not be returned to its raging owner
with a deposit of money, which also should not be returned so long as it
would cause damage (332a). But here there is no requirement that the
owner be in a rage; the potential for damage is enough."*^
2. Providing such money to a student or to oneself to enable that person
to be free from the lowly pursuit of income in order to spend more time
studying philosophy could be an act of true justice since it could lead to the
development or preservation of a harmonious soul.''*
The Republic is in part a reply to the various accusations leveled against
Socrates, before, during and apparently even after his trial and execution.''''
Although Socrates was not charged with theft in his trial, Aristophanes does
'*' See also Xenophon's Oikonomikos (1. 13), where Socrates argues that money, when used
to obtain a prostitute, is not a form of wealth, since it is not beneficial.
*^ See 591c. The pseudo-Platonic Eryxias raises the possibility that money obtained through
wicked practices could lead to the acquisition of virtue (404d2-e7).
*" On the question of anti-Socratic polemics after the trial, see A.-H. Chroust, Socrates, Man
and Myth: The Two Socratic Apologies ofXenophon (London 1957).
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make such a charge in the Clouds (177-79).''^ Xenophon indicates that
Socrates was blamed in part for the thievish behavior of his one-time
associate Critias (he was kleptistatos: Mem. 1. 2. 12). Xenophon himself
has nothing to respond to those who claim that Socrates should not have
taught his associates politics before teaching them moderation, and clearly
acknowledges that Socratic moderation was the basis of his just behavior
{Mem. 1.2. 17; 1.2. 1-2).
This agrees fully with what we have seen in the Republic. Socrates
obeys vulgar standards of justice, so far as he does, not on principled
grounds, but because he is moderate and needs little. Given his small needs,
Socrates would have had little incentive to seek the property of others, or
rather he would have had incentive to seek only a little of it. On the other
hand, Socrates defends the individual's right to take any action necessary
for the pursuit of the psychic harmony of his soul. The uncomfortable
parallel in Xenophon strongly suggests that the historical Socrates did teach
something along these lines.
I do not wish to suggest that the historical Socrates actually engaged in
theft, and I am not sure that Aristophanes meant his charge to be taken
altogether seriously. But it appears that his teaching made clear the
"justice" of some acts ordinarily considered unjust, and it is to Plato's credit
that he was able to defend Socrates' unique conception of justice without
giving it a complete whitewash.
In sum, Plato himself, as well as his character Socrates, is clearly aware
of the problematic character of the answer offered to Glaucon and
Adeimantus. This answer does not actually constitute a defense or an
attempted defense of the vulgar justice Socrates was asked to defend. Plato
does not regard vulgar justice as defensible or worthy of serious defense.
He seems fully aware that the observance of Platonic justice does not
necessarily entail the observance of vulgar standards of justice, but, unlike
all his recent commentators, he is not bothered by that fact, and he is right
not to be bothered by it. In his view, Platonic justice does not need to be
justified on vulgar standards; it is of inherent value in its own right, even if
it does conflict with vulgar justice at times. There is nothing deeply
problematic about this conflict. If Plato has no defense of vulgar justice, if
it is in fact indefensible in his view, then it is not obligating. And there is
certainly no reason to make a defense of Platonic justice dependent on its
conformity with its vulgar relation. Viewed from this perspective, Plato's
theory of justice and just action is consistent, plausible and contains no
obvious fallacies.
Bar Ilan University
'^^ Charges of Socratic thievery may be found also in Libanius, whose fourth-century A.D.
defense of Socrates may reflect earlier literature, contemporary with Socrates. For such
charges, see sections 13, 86, 103 and 112. On the possible influence of Polycrates' anti-
Socratic polemic on Libanius, see Chroust (previous note).
